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Approaching the Limit
Early National Lessons from Welfare Reform
Sheldon Danziger
University of Michigan
Welfare reform has been one of the most controversial social poli-
cies of recent times.  A Democratic president abandoned welfare reform
legislation drafted by his administration—the Work and Responsibility
Act (announced by President Clinton on June 14, 1994)—and support-
ed legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, crafted by a Republican Congress.
PRWORA ended the entitlement to cash assistance for poor families
with children and relinquished to the states the authority for decisions
about most policies affecting welfare recipients.  Within a few years of
passage, PRWORA had “ended welfare as we knew it” more decisively
than most policy analysts expected when the legislation was signed;
welfare caseloads dropped so dramatically that, by the middle of 2000,
the number of recipients had fallen below 6 million, about the same
number as the late 1960s. 
Several early lessons have emerged from dozens of recent studies
of PRWORA’s effects.  In this chapter, I emphasize changes across the
nation as a whole; other chapters focus on rural/urban differences.
Some of the factors I discuss—for example, caseload declines—are
similar in rural and urban areas.  Others, however, such as job growth
and access, differ. 
The first lesson is that economic conditions, federal government
policy changes, and state welfare policy changes in the last few years
have contributed to increased employment and net earnings.  As a re-
sult, the dramatic caseload decline has not produced the dire scenario
that some analysts predicted. PRWORA has not caused a surge in
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poverty or homelessness, because most former recipients are finding
jobs.  Even though many welfare “leavers,” as they are called, are not
working full-time, full-year, a significant number are earning at least as
much as they had received in cash welfare benefits.  
Second, because very favorable economic conditions—rapid eco-
nomic growth, low inflation, and low unemployment—ended in mid
2001, we do not yet know how welfare reform will play out during a re-
cession or even during a period of moderate unemployment rates and
slow economic growth.  Indeed, because PRWORA placed a five-year,
lifetime limit on the receipt of cash assistance, recipients who continue
to receive welfare (stayers), and who face greater barriers to employ-
ment than those who have already left the rolls, are at risk of hitting
their time limits during a recession.  At the present time, we do not
know whether the possible coincidence of millions of recipients ex-
hausting eligibility for cash assistance during a recession might pro-
duce the increased child poverty and extreme hardships that critics pre-
dicted PRWORA would cause.  Also, we do not know whether
Congress and the states might respond to the recession of 2001–2002
by increasing the number of exemptions allowed from or extensions to
federal time limits, providing work-for-welfare community service em-
ployment, creating state-funded programs for those who exhaust feder-
al benefits, or implementing some mixture of the above.  
A third early lesson is that, despite the large caseload reduction, the
national poverty rate  has fallen rather little.  Many who have left wel-
fare for work remain poor and continue to depend on food stamps,
Medicaid, and other government assistance; others have left welfare
and remain poor but do not receive the food stamp or Medicaid benefits
to which they remain entitled.  The extent of economic hardship re-
mains high because, given their human capital and personal character-
istics, many former and current welfare recipients have limited earn-
ings prospects in a labor market that increasingly demands higher
skills.  Thus, despite promising early results with respect to declining
caseloads and increasing work effort, much uncertainty exists about the
long-run prospects for escaping poverty of both welfare stayers and
leavers. 
In this chapter, I present some evidence that documents these early
lessons.  In the next section, I place welfare reform in an economic con-
text by reviewing changes in earnings and family incomes over the past
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several decades.  I then analyze early findings regarding welfare reform
by using cross-sectional national data on trends in work, welfare re-
ceipt, and poverty, as well as panel data from a study that my col-
leagues at the University of Michigan and I are conducting.  I conclude
with a discussion of policy implications for the post-PRWORA era.  
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In the late 1990s, many less-skilled and less-educated workers and
former welfare recipients continued to have difficulty earning enough
to support their families.  Despite robust economic recoveries in both
the 1980s and the 1990s, the bottom 40 percent of the population has
benefited relatively little.  The economic prospects for the less-skilled
improved after 1993, when the unemployment rate and the poverty rate
began falling.  The unemployment rate for adult men fell from 6.7 per-
cent in January 1993 to 3.2 percent in September 2000, the lowest male
unemployment rate since December 1973.  The rate for adult women
fell from 6.3 percent in January 1993 to 3.5 percent in September 2000,
the lowest female unemployment rate since December 1969.  The offi-
cial poverty rate nationwide fell every year between 1993 and 2000,
from 15.1 percent to 11.3 percent.  
Nonetheless, the long economic recovery did not benefit the disad-
vantaged enough to restore their economic well-being to where it stood
a quarter century ago.  The 2000 poverty rate is still higher than the
1973 rate (11.1 percent) and much higher than the rates of Canada,
Japan, and most northern European countries (Jantti and Danziger
2000).
Typically, poverty falls as real per capita income increases during
economic recoveries and rises as income falls during recessions.  The
increases in poverty and income inequality in the late 1970s and early
1980s, however, were so great that it now requires substantially higher
real per capita income to achieve the same poverty rate as it did a quar-
ter century ago.  The 2000 poverty rate for central city residents, 16.1
percent, is 5.0 percentage points below the 1993 rate (21.5 percent), but
about 3.5 points above its 1969 historical low (12.7 percent).  Likewise,
the 2000 rate for residents of nonmetropolitan areas, 13.4 percent, is
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about 4 percentage points below its 1993 rate (17.2 percent) and just
about at its 1978 historical low (13.5 percent).1
Even though per capita income was higher in the late 1990s than in
the late 1960s, the average inflation-adjusted wage of production work-
ers was lower.  After a continued increase that ended in October 1972,
workers’ hourly earnings fell 13 percent between 1972 and 1993.  Since
1993, earnings have been rising.  Average hourly earnings in October
2000 were $13.88 per hour, 7 percent above the rate of October 1993,
but still below the October 1972 peak.  These data include male and fe-
male workers of all ages and with all levels of work experience.  Wel-
fare recipients, on average, earned much less than the average wage be-
cause they were younger, less-experienced, and had fewer years of
schooling and less labor market skills than the average worker.  
The trend in women’s earnings is somewhat better than that for all
workers because the labor market changes of the last three decades
have disproportionately hurt less-skilled males.  However, a review of
trends in the annual earnings of single mothers suggests that a typical
welfare recipient is likely to have a difficult time earning enough to
support her family.  The top line in Figure 1.1 shows median real annu-
al earnings (in 1998 constant dollars) from 1967–1998 for single moth-
ers between the ages of 18 and 64 who report earnings.2 In 1998, their
median annual earnings were $16,352, just about the poverty line for a
family of four.  The bottom line shows the trend for a single mother at
the 20th percentile of the annual earnings distribution and better repre-
sents the earnings prospects of welfare recipients, whose educational
attainment and skills are significantly lower than those of the median
single mother.  Over these three decades, annual earnings at the 20th
percentile increased 56 percent, from $4,590 to $7,154, with more than
half of this increase occurring between 1994 and 1998. 
If one focuses only on women who work full-time (data not shown),
one finds that a single mother of three children at the 20th percen-
tile, with earnings as her only source of income, would escape poverty
only if she worked full-time, full-year.  As discussed below, however,
most women leaving welfare for work do not work full-time, full-year.
Thus, if they are to escape poverty, they must continue to rely on gov-
ernment income supplements, such as food stamps, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, and subsidies for day care and health care expenses. 
In sum, the longest peacetime economic expansion in history did
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SOURCE: Computations from annual March Current Population Surveys, provided by
Deborah Reed, Public Policy Institute of California.
Figure 1.1  Annual Real Earnings of Single Mothers, Ages 18–64,
1967–98 (nonearners excluded) 
not manage to restore the poverty rate and average wage rate to the lev-
els achieved three decades ago.  We have never been wealthier as a na-
tion, but millions of families still have difficulty making ends meet.
For single mothers, moving from welfare to work is a necessary, but
not sufficient, first step along the path out of poverty.  The strong work
incentives and work requirements of the 1996 act have, to date, pro-
duced only a small decline in the national poverty rate because welfare
mothers have relatively low earnings prospects.  Despite our national
commitment to encouraging work, we have in place a safety net that
does little to provide work opportunities for those who have trouble
finding a job or working full-time, full-year.  This brief review of labor
market trends suggests that reducing poverty in the post-welfare-re-
form era for both single mothers and poor families not receiving wel-
fare requires government to increase income supplements for low earn-
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ers and provide some employment opportunities for those left behind
despite a robust economic recovery.
EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON WORK AND
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
I now examine emerging evidence on changes in the work effort,
welfare receipt, and economic well-being of single mothers in the post-
welfare-reform era.  I do not attempt to evaluate the unique effects 
of welfare reform on these outcomes independent of economic condi-
tions and other policy changes, given that such an evaluation requires a
behavioral model of labor supply and welfare participation decisions
that is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Several recent policy and economic changes have shaped work and
welfare outcomes for single mothers.  First, by replacing the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program with the Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF) program, PRWORA dramatically re-
duced the likelihood that a single mother can “choose” to remain a non-
working welfare recipient, even if she finds that the economic benefits
of working do not exceed its costs.  There is no longer an entitlement to
cash assistance; welfare is a transitional program with cash assistance
conditional on the performance of work-related or community service
activities.  In most states, a recipient who refuses to take an available,
low-wage job will be sanctioned.  
On the other hand, many states have expanded policies that allow
recipients to combine work and welfare, notably by increasing earnings
disregards so that recipients can have some earnings that do not direct-
ly offset their welfare benefits (Acs et al. 1998; Gallagher et al. 1998).
Taken together, changes in welfare policy have led more recipients to
look for work, have made it more difficult for nonworking recipients to
remain on the rolls, and have increased the financial benefit for recipi-
ents to work part-time at low-wage jobs (Corcoran et al. 2000;
Danziger et al. 2000a).
Other policy changes have increased the returns from work for all
low earners.  The minimum wage was increased from $4.25 to $5.15 in
1997, just after welfare reform was implemented.  In 1993, President
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Clinton proposed and Congress passed a major expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  In 1998, a working single mother was eli-
gible for a maximum EITC of $2,272 if she had one child and of $3,756
if she had two or more children.  The Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (CHIP) of 1997 subsidizes health care for children of the working
poor, thereby making jobs that do not provide health care coverage
more attractive to women leaving welfare.  Finally, as noted above, the
labor market in the late 1990s was much tighter than it had been for
years, making it easier for welfare mothers to find jobs. 
Against this background of state and federal public policy and eco-
nomic changes, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid 1990s.
Some of this decline is undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to the
nonwelfare policy changes, some to the booming economy, and some
to the interactions among them (Danziger 1999).  
National Trends by Residence
Table 1.1 presents March Current Population Survey data for se-
lected years between 1969 and 1998 on trends in the work effort, wel-
fare receipt, median welfare income, and the poverty rate of single
mothers ages 18–54 who have at least one child residing with them.
Data are shown separately for residents of central cities, residents liv-
ing in metropolitan areas but not within central cities, and nonmetro-
politan area residents.  The patterns for each variable are strikingly sim-
ilar regardless of place of residence.  Between 1969 and 1989, work
effort, welfare receipt, and the family poverty rate were relatively sta-
ble.  By 1998, however, work effort had increased substantially, wel-
fare receipt declined dramatically, and poverty declined modestly in
most residential groups.
For single mothers who worked (i.e., who reported earnings) at
some time during the year, work effort was roughly constant for each
residential group in 1969, 1979, and 1989; in 1998, work increased by
about 12.5 percentage points for central city residents and by about 8
percentage points for the other groups.  In 1998, median earnings were
about $14,000 for single mothers residing in central cities and non-
metro areas and about $20,000 for those living in the noncentral city
portion of metro areas (earnings data not shown).  
The trend in the percentage of single mothers reporting cash wel-
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Table 1.1  Trends in Work, Welfare Receipt, and Poverty for Single
Mothers with Children, by Residence
Economic outcome Central city
Remainder 
of metro Nonmetro
Percent reporting earnings during
the year
1969 64.7 74.6 73.4
1979 65.5 78.2 73.4
1989 64.3 78.2 76.0
1998 76.8 86.6 84.3
Percent reporting welfare during
the year
1969 41.2 21.1 27.3
1979 42.9 27.7 28.6
1989 41.2 21.8 28.0
1998 27.9 14.0 16.5
Median welfare income of
recipients ($1998)
1969 8,837 8,539 4,600
1979 6,978 6,168 4,414
1989 5,048 4,454 3,423
1998 3,108 2,844 2,400
Official family poverty rate (%)
1969 47.8 32.4 48.8
1979 48.9 28.8 40.0
1989 52.2 31.6 49.3
1998 48.0 30.8 43.3
NOTE: Single mothers include women between the ages of 18 and 54 who are never-
married, divorced, separated, or widowed and reside with at least one child under the
age of 18.  Each family is counted once; data are weighted.  Because of confidential-
ity reasons, especially in small states, some observations are listed as “residence not
identified”; those observations are excluded.
SOURCE: Computations by author from March Current Population Survey computer
tapes.
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fare receipt at some time during the year was quite similar to earnings
trends.  Welfare receipt was similar for each residential group in 1969,
1979, and 1989 (the rate of welfare receipt is higher in every year
among central city residents); by 1998, it had declined by 13.2 percent-
age points for central city residents and by about 8–12 points for the
other two groups.  
Median welfare benefits, adjusted for inflation, fell dramatically
over the three decades for all groups.  In 1998, annual welfare income
for recipients was about $3,100 per year for central city residents,
$2,800 for those living in the non-central-city portion of metro areas,
and $2,400 for residents of nonmetro areas.  
Poverty rates increased some between 1969 and 1989, but by 1998,
they were about the same as in 1969 and 1979 for single mothers resid-
ing in central cities and somewhat above the 1979 rates for residents of
the suburbs and nonmetro areas.  Between 1989 and 1998, poverty
rates fell, but by a smaller amount than the decline in welfare receipt—
by about 4 percentage points for single mothers residing in central
cities, 1 point for suburban residents, and 6 points for residents of non-
metro areas.
Detailed Results from a Post–Welfare Reform 
Panel Study of Michigan Residents
I now analyze data on work effort and economic well-being fol-
lowing welfare reform from the first two waves of the Women’s Em-
ployment Study (WES) of the Poverty Research and Training Center at
the University of Michigan (see Danziger et al. 2000b for more infor-
mation on the study).  I examine the relationship between human capi-
tal and other personal characteristics and work effort, and I evaluate
differences in economic well-being between workers and nonworkers. 
All respondents were first observed as welfare recipients.  The wo-
men were systematically selected with equal probability from an or-
dered list of single mothers with children who received cash assistance
in an urban Michigan county in February 1997.  To be eligible, they had
to be U.S. citizens between the ages of 18 and 54, and be either Cau-
casian or African American.  At the time the sample was drawn, their
average number of years of welfare receipt since turning age 18 was
7.3.  Interviews were conducted in fall 1997 and in fall 1998.  The re-
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sponse rate was 86 percent for the first wave (N = 753) and 92 percent
for the second wave of the panel (N = 693 who participated in both
waves).  Both interviews lasted approximately one hour.3
Work and welfare outcomes
The study gathered information on a variety of problems that might
affect a woman’s likelihood of moving into the workforce and finding
and a keeping job.  We included traditional human capital measures,
such as whether the recipient had completed high school, the extent of
her labor force skills, and previous work experience.  We also included
measures of a range of mental and physical health problems, access to
automobiles, perceptions of previous experiences of discrimination,
and other psychosocial and familial attributes. 
The fall 1998 interviews, which occurred roughly 20 months after
the initial sample was drawn, allow us to evaluate differences between
women who are working and those who are not about two years after
PRWORA was introduced.  Table 1.2 lists our measures of 14 barriers
to employment.  The first five barriers are measured only at wave 1 be-
cause any changes in their prevalence are likely to have occurred in re-
sponse to work effort changes between waves 1 and 2.  For example, if
a woman at wave 1 had not performed at least four of the nine work
tasks on a previous job, we classified her as having low skills.  The only
way for her to have low skills at wave 1 and not at wave 2 was for her
to have acquired those skills while working on a job between the two
waves.  The next nine barriers are evaluated at both waves; they de-
scribe conditions that may be episodic.  In this chapter, a woman is
counted as having these barriers only if they were present at both
waves.  At wave 1, we found that most of these barriers were negative-
ly and significantly related to the likelihood that a respondent was
working at least 20 hours per week (Danziger et al. 2000a).  
Most barriers to employment are also correlated with whether or
not a woman was working at the time of the wave 2 interview and the
extent of her work involvement between the two waves.  The columns
in Table 1.3 classify 675 of the 693 women who completed both sur-
veys into one of four mutually exclusive categories based on their work
and welfare income status in fall 1998 (the 18 women who are exclud-
ed had moved from welfare to the Supplemental Security Income pro-
Chapter 1 35
Table 1.2  Measures of Employment Barriers
Education, work experience, job skills, and workplace norms (at wave 1)
1. Less than a high school education
2. Low work experience (worked in fewer than 20 percent of years since 
age 18)
3. Fewer than 4 job skills on a previous job (out of a possible 9)
4. Knows 5 or fewer work norms (out of a possible 9)
Perceived discrimination (at wave 1)
5. Reports 4 or more instances of prior discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, or welfare status (out of a possible 16)
Transportation problem (at both waves)
6. Does not have access to a car and/or does not have a driver’s license
Psychiatric disorders and substance dependence within past year (at both
waves)
7. Major depressive disorder
8. PTSD – Post-traumatic stress disorder
9. Generalized anxiety disorder or social phobia
10. Alcohol dependence
11. Drug dependence
Physical health problems (at both waves)
12. Mother’s health problem (self-reported fair/poor health and 
age-specific physical limitation)
13. Child health problem (has a health, learning, or emotional problem)
Domestic violence (at both waves)
14. Severe abuse from a partner within past year
gram by fall 1998 and hence were not expected to work).4 We define
wage-reliant mothers as those who reported positive earnings but no
cash assistance in the month prior to the interview; they are 43.6 per-
cent of the sample (N = 294).5 The next group includes combiners, wo-
men who reported both earnings and cash assistance in the month prior
to the interview; they make up 27.1 percent of respondents (N = 183).




















Measured at wave 1 (%)
Less than high school education 31.2 22.8 32.2 45.7 35.6
Low work experience 14.8 9.9 11.0 27.5 20.3
Fewer than 4 skills 20.6 18.0 13.7 33.3 25.0
Fewer than 5 work norms 9.2 7.5 11.0 11.7 6.7
4+ experiences of discrimination 13.8 11.9 11.5 18.8 18.3
Present at both waves (%)
Transportation barrier 30.2 21.1 27.3 52.2 33.3
Psychiatric diagnosise 16.1 10.9 15.8 24.6 23.3
Alcohol or drug dependence 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.7 1.7
Health barrier 10.6 8.5 5.0 19.6 16.7
Child health barrier 10.3 7.5 8.2 17.6 13.8
Domestic violence 6.1 3.7 7.7 8.7 6.7
Mean number of barriers (11 total) 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.0
a Wage-reliant are mothers relying only on earnings to support their families; they made up 43.6% of sample.
b Combiners were those receiving both earnings and welfare; they made up 27.1% of the sample. 
c Welfare-reliant mothers relied only on welfare (they were not working) and made up 20.4% of the sample.
d No work/no welfare were those receiving neither welfare nor earnings from work; they made up 8.9% of the sample.
e Coded “1” if respondent had depression, generalized anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder at wave 1, and depression,
social phobia, or post-traumatic stress disorder at wave 2. 
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study.
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from earnings in the month prior to the interview, but who reported re-
ceiving income from TANF; they represent 20.4 percent of respondents
(N = 138).  The remaining 8.9 percent (N = 60) of the sample includes
women who were neither working nor receiving TANF benefits in fall
1998. 
Table 1.3 shows how women in these work-welfare income cate-
gories differ in the prevalence of barriers.  The last row shows the mean
number of barriers for women in each of the categories.  In this table,
we combine the separate diagnoses for psychiatric disorders into a sin-
gle variable and alcohol and substance dependence into a single vari-
able. 
The results are quite dramatic.  The women who are wage-reliant at
wave 2 are much less likely to have most of these barriers to employ-
ment, and the women who were not working at wave 2 (right-most two
columns) are much more likely to face barriers.  The welfare-reliant
mothers have the highest prevalence on 10 of the 11 barriers (although
some of these differences are not significant).  These differences are
present for human capital, mental health, and health barriers.  For ex-
ample, 22.8 percent of the wage-reliant have less than a high school de-
gree, compared with 45.7 percent of the welfare-reliant.  In addition,
10.9 percent of the wage-reliant met diagnostic screening criteria for at
least one of the three psychiatric disorders we asked about at both
waves.  In contrast, 24.6 percent of the welfare-reliant met such cri-
teria. 
These results suggest caution in simply classifying welfare recipi-
ents as “stayers” or “leavers” in the aftermath of PRWORA, as has
been done in most recent studies.  Table 1.3 documents substantial dif-
ferences in the extent of barriers between leavers who are wage-reliant
and those who are not working (no work/no welfare), and substantial
difference between stayers who are working (combiners) and those
who are not (welfare-reliant).  In fact, those who are working (wage-re-
liant and combiners) and those who are not working (the welfare-re-
liant and those neither working nor receiving cash assistance) are simi-
lar to each other in terms of their mean number of barriers.  The former
two working groups average 1.2 and 1.4 barriers, respectively, whereas
nonworkers average 2.3 and 2, respectively. 
Figure 1.2 graphs the relationship between the number of barriers
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NOTE: The “Number of Persistent Barriers” is a count of wave 1 measures of high
school education, work experience, skills, work norms, and discrimination; and two-
wave measures of transportation, mental health, substance dependence, health, child
health, and domestic violence (see Table 1.3).
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study data.
Figure 1.2  Persistent Employment Barriers, by Percentage of Months
Worked between Wave 1 and Wave 2 
and the extent of work, measured by the percentage of months a re-
spondent worked between the two surveys.6 The percentage of months
worked falls from 81.5 percent for respondents who did not have any of
the barriers (27.4 percent of the sample) to only 6.7 percent for the 1.9
percent of the sample with six or more barriers.  A respondent with two
barriers worked, on average, in about two-thirds of the months, where-
as a respondent with four barriers worked in fewer than two-fifths of
the months.  This pattern of declining work as the extent of barriers in-
creases is remarkably similar to the pattern we observed for those who
were working at least 20 hours per week at the first wave of the survey
(Danziger et al. 2000b). 
Despite a booming economy and pressures from state agencies to
Chapter 1 39
find jobs, it has been difficult for many of these current and former wel-
fare recipients to stay employed.  About two-fifths of respondents
worked in every month between the fall 1997 and fall 1998 surveys,
whereas 13 percent did not work in a single month.  The percentage
working in any month between the two waves varied little, ranging
from 60 percent to 70 percent.  One reason that poverty has not de-
clined as fast as the caseload is that few former recipients are working
full-time, full-year.  In addition, as the next section shows, poverty
among the respondents remains high.
Financial well-being
Given that a majority of respondents was working in fall 1998,  I
now evaluate the extent to which “work pays,” that is, whether working
respondents have higher incomes than nonworking welfare recipients.
Respondents were asked to report, for the month before the interview,
their work hours, earnings, welfare receipt, and income from a variety
of sources.  These sources include the earnings of other household
members, cash assistance from TANF, food stamps, Social Security
and other pension and disability income, Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI), unemployment compensation, child support, cash contri-
butions from other household members and from outside friends and
family, and any other income not previously mentioned.7 We also
asked about expenses for work-related child care and transportation.
We also have information on cash assistance received from official
records of Michigan’s Family Independence Agency.
Table 1.4 presents two measures of mean monthly income and the
monthly poverty rate in fall 1998 for respondents, classified by their
work/welfare income status in the survey month (see Danziger et al.
2001 for greater detail on financial well-being).  Monthly income is the
sum of work-based income, welfare-based income, and income from
other sources, less work-related child care and transportation expenses.
In addition to the reported income sources, we imputed the value of
federal taxes paid, the EITC, and the employee’s share of Social Secu-
rity taxes.  We imputed the value of federal taxes paid and the value of
the EITC received based on respondents’ own earnings, unemployment
insurance, marital status, and number of children.8 The employee’s




Table 1.4  Monthly Income and Monthly Poverty Rate, by Work and Welfare Status
















Net income, excluding earnings of
household members other than
husbands ($) 1,213 1,405 1,277 892 798
Net income, including earnings
from all household members ($) 1,418 1,677 1,449 1,027 1,178
Poverty rate using row 1 income
concept (%) 61.2 47.4 55.3 91.1 78.6
Poverty ratee using row 2 income
concept (%) 53.5 38.4 50.3 83.3 68.3
a Wage-reliant are mothers relying only on earnings to support their families; they made up 43.6% of sample.
b Combiners were those receiving both earnings and welfare; they made up 27.1% of the sample. 
c Welfare-reliant mothers relied only on welfare (they were not working) and made up 20.4% of the sample.
d No work/no welfare were those receiving neither welfare nor earnings from work; they made up 8.9% 
of the sample. 
e To determine the monthly poverty rate, the official poverty line was divided by 12 and compared with 
monthly income. 
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study data.
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fore turning to the results, I discuss differences in receipt of the various
income sources.
By definition, all wage-reliant women and all women combining
work and welfare had earnings in the interview month, whereas wel-
fare-reliant mothers and those not working and not receiving welfare
did not.  Wage-reliant mothers earned more per month than did com-
biners—$987 versus $626 (data not shown).  Compared with combin-
ers, wage-reliant mothers were more likely to be working at least 35
hours per week (66 percent vs. 37 percent), and they earned a higher
average hourly wage ($7.63 vs. $6.52).  Almost every working mother
in the sample was eligible for the EITC.  We estimate that wage-reliant
mothers received, on average, $202 per month; combiners received
$191.  Federal income and Social Security taxes decreased the earnings
of wage-reliant mothers by $142 per month and those of combiners by
$78 per month. 
Substantial numbers of respondents co-resided with another house-
hold member who worked.  About 35 percent of wage-reliant mothers,
21 percent of combiners, 17 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and 52
percent of those neither working nor receiving welfare lived in a house-
hold with an additional earner.  These other earners, many of whom are
husbands or cohabiting partners, earned on average more than the re-
spondents.
All welfare-reliant mothers and combiners, by definition, received
TANF benefits that averaged $441 and $275 per month, respectively.10
Welfare-reliant mothers and combiners were much more likely to re-
ceive food stamps than wage-reliant mothers and those not working
and not receiving cash assistance—about 90 percent of the former two
groups, compared to about half of the latter two groups.  The average
value of food stamps ranged from $182–$240 across the groups. 
Wage-reliant women had higher child care and transportation costs
than did welfare-reliant women.  The majority of both groups of work-
ing mothers (77 percent of wage-reliant mothers and 64 percent of
combiners) reported work-related transportation expenses that aver-
aged $74 and $63 per month, respectively.  Slightly more than one-
quarter of the two groups of working mothers reported out-of-pocket
child care expenses that averaged $264 to $316 per month.11
Table 1.4 presents two measures of monthly income.  First, income
from all sources (excluding the earnings of household members other
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than husbands) is summed, the EITC is added, and income and payroll
taxes are subtracted, as are work-related transportation and child care
expenses.  This measure does not include the earnings of household
members other than husbands because we do not know the extent to
which these members actually share their earnings with the respondents.
In the second measure of monthly income, these earnings are included. 
The average net monthly income (first row) was $1,405 for wage-
reliant mothers, $1,277 for combiners, $892 for welfare-reliant moth-
ers, and $798 for those neither working nor receiving welfare.  Adding
the earnings of all household members raised these averages to $1,677,
$1,449, $1,027, and $1,178, respectively.  Because a larger percentage
of the women who neither worked nor received welfare live with an-
other earner who is not their husband, the increase in their income be-
tween rows 1 and 2 is greater than the increase for the other three
groups.
For both measures, working mothers have a substantial income ad-
vantage over welfare-reliant mothers.  When the earnings of household
members other than husbands are excluded, average net income for
wage-reliant mothers was 58 percent higher than that of the welfare-re-
liant.  When the earnings of other household members are included,
wage-reliant mothers had an average net income that was 63 percent
higher than that of the welfare-reliant.  Women combining work and
welfare had net incomes (second row) 41 percent higher than those of
the welfare-reliant.  Thus, in the post-PRWORA era, it does pay to
move from welfare to work.  
Table 1.4 also presents the monthly poverty rates for the four
groups of respondents (we divide the official 1998 federal poverty
threshold for a household of that size by 12).  A large portion of work-
ers remain poor.  When earnings of household members other than hus-
bands are excluded, 47.4 percent of wage-reliant mothers, 55.3 percent
of combiners, 91.1 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and 78.6 percent
of those who neither worked nor received welfare were poor.  When
earnings of all household members are included, the poverty rates for
the wage-reliant, combiners, the welfare-reliant, and those neither
working nor receiving welfare fall to 38.4 percent, 50.3 percent, 83.3
percent, and 68.3 percent, respectively.
The good news is that poverty is much lower for both income mea-
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sures among workers than among nonworkers.  In addition, about 80
percent of the wage-reliant mothers earn more than the maximum
TANF benefit in Michigan (a state that has above-average benefit lev-
els).  The bad news is that poverty remains very high for workers.  Also,
the annual poverty rate for the wage-reliant and combiners is higher
than Table 1.4 indicates because most of them do not work in every
month, and hence do not earn this much in every month.12
We have not attempted to determine the extent to which these dif-
ferences in poverty rates are due to welfare policy changes, the very fa-
vorable economic climate, or other policy changes.  In Michigan, how-
ever, the decision of the state to allow recipients an earnings disregard
(the first $200 of monthly earnings does not reduce welfare benefits;
welfare is reduced by 80 cents for every additional dollar earned) and
the absence of a time limit have encouraged women to combine work
and welfare.  Women whose earnings would have disqualified them
from cash assistance a decade ago can now receive some welfare bene-
fits.  Even if the cash benefit amount is small, its receipt increases the
likelihood that a respondent will continue to receive food stamps and
Medicaid.  In addition, the tight labor market has made it easier for re-
spondents to get and keep jobs.  Nonetheless, most working respon-
dents are not escaping poverty on their paychecks alone, and a substan-
tial fraction of the wage-reliant and combiners continue to receive
government assistance (e.g., TANF, food stamps, EITC), or to rely on
cash contributions from friends and family, or both.  
Several implications concerning welfare reform follow from these
findings.  First, in a booming economy, most welfare recipients can find
some work and many can escape poverty.   In addition, the economic
incentives now in place are in accord with the goals of policy plan-
ners—on average, wage-reliant mothers and those combining work and
welfare are economically better off than welfare-reliant mothers.  Sec-
ond, these results suggest that more attention should be paid to factors
that prevent some of the welfare-reliant from finding steady employ-
ment.  The new economic incentives and the increased pressure to
leave the welfare rolls make it unlikely that many welfare-reliant moth-
ers are rejecting work and choosing to stay on welfare.  Rather, as
shown in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2, many of them have multiple prob-
lems, such as poor physical or mental health or lack of job skills, which
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prevent them from getting and keeping jobs even when unemployment
rates are low.  
Third, in the aftermath of welfare reform, many welfare-reliant
mothers are at high risk of losing their welfare benefits owing to im-
pending sanctions or time limits.  In many states, mothers combining
work and welfare are also at risk of losing benefits owing to impending
time limits.  Now that it is economically beneficial to move from wel-
fare to work, there remains a need for policies to make work pay
enough so that a greater percentage of working mothers can escape
poverty and for enhanced policies to help welfare-reliant mothers move
into regular jobs or into subsidized employment.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In 1959,  Robert J. Lampman testified to the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of Congress that
[a] more aggressive government policy could hasten the elimina-
tion of poverty and bring about its virtual elimination in one gen-
eration.  A program directed against poverty should be of several
parts.  The basic part should be one of insuring high levels of em-
ployment and increasing average product per worker.  This should
be supplemented by special private and public programs for those
groups who do not readily share in the benefits of economic
progress . . . Almost a fifth of the nation’s children are being reared
in low-income status, and it is critical in the strategy against
poverty that these children have educational opportunities that are
not inferior to the national average.  The costs of such a program
would be offset by positive gains in terms of both economic and
human values. (Lampman 1959, pp. 4–5)
Unfortunately, 40 years later, the very same aggressive policies are
needed if our generation is to “hasten the elimination of poverty.”  De-
spite unprecedented prosperity, more than one-fifth of the nation’s chil-
dren are now being reared in poverty.  Despite self-accolades about our
compassion, as a nation we do not even discuss, much less pursue, an
“aggressive policy” to “hasten the elimination of poverty.”  
Declining employer demand for less-skilled workers means that
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their wage rates remain low and poverty stays high even when labor
markets are tight.  Additional policy responses are required if we are to
ensure that a single mother working full-time at the minimum wage
will have an income above the poverty line, after accounting for taxes
paid, work-related expenses, and tax credits received.  Policies to
achieve this goal can be implemented if we are willing to spend gov-
ernment funds on them. 
Any social welfare system produces errors of commission and
omission.  The pre-1996 welfare system did provide cash assistance to
some recipients who could have made it on their own in the labor mar-
ket.  Some welfare recipients were unwilling to look for a job, others
turned down job offers because the wages were low or because they did
not provide health insurance.  Others chose to stay at home to care for
their children.  The 1996 law reflects the expectations of policymakers
and taxpayers that anyone offered a minimum-wage job should accept
it.  Indeed, the law allows states to curtail benefits for anyone who does
not search for work or cooperate with the welfare agency.  
However, the law does not reflect the fact that finding a job has be-
come more difficult for less-skilled workers over the past three de-
cades.  The early results from welfare reform reviewed here suggest
that many recipients are likely to reach time limits without finding sta-
ble jobs even if economic conditions remain as favorable as they were
at the end of the 1990s.  They will be terminated from cash assistance
even if they are willing to work, either because they cannot find any
employer to hire them or because their personal attributes make it un-
likely that they can work steadily.  This problem will increase during
recessions and will persist even in good economic times because em-
ployers continue to escalate their demands for a skilled workforce. 
Because I support a work-oriented safety net, I am not suggesting a
return to the pre-1996 welfare status quo.  Welfare recipients and the
unemployed should have the personal responsibility to look for work.
However, if they diligently search for work without finding a job, assis-
tance should not be terminated.  At a minimum, those who are willing
to work but unable to find jobs should be offered an opportunity to per-
form community service in return for continued welfare benefits.  A
more costly option, but one that would have a greater antipoverty im-
pact, would be to provide low-wage public service “jobs of last resort”
(see Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, Chapter 8).
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Data from the panel study from a Michigan county also suggest
that many welfare recipients face multiple barriers to employment—
e.g., health and mental health problems, low education, and low job
skills.  Some will need greater access to treatment and social services
before they can even take advantage of community service employ-
ment.  Many could benefit from relatively modest changes in current
work-first programs, such as increased emphasis on and support for job
retention services.
For people who are able to find jobs, the key elements of a policy to
“make work pay and end poverty as we know it” are expanded wage
supplements, refundable child care tax credits, extensions of transition-
al Medicaid, and a higher minimum wage.  The Earned Income Tax
Credit, which was substantially expanded in 1993, has done much to
offset the decline in real wages for workers at the bottom of the earn-
ings distribution who work year-round and who have children (Ell-
wood 1999).  Further increases in the EITC, for example for married
couples, absent fathers, and families with three or more children, would
make the federal income tax more progressive and increase the EITC’s
already large antipoverty impact.   Several states have adopted their
own EITCs for families with children, something other states should
consider, especially those that continue to impose income and high
sales taxes on the working poor.
Many of the working poor spend a substantial portion of their earn-
ings on child care.  The Dependent Care Credit (DCC) in the federal in-
come tax should be made refundable; doing so would raise the dispos-
able income of low-income working families who spend substantial
sums on child care but who do not benefit from the way this nonrefund-
able credit is currently structured.
In addition, in the Michigan study, almost one-third of welfare
leavers had no health insurance for themselves in fall 1998; they had
exhausted their transitional Medicaid benefits and were either not cov-
ered by their employer or could not afford the monthly payments.  Ex-
tending transitional Medicaid further or expanding CHIP to include
parents who are former welfare recipients would help address this
problem.  Finally, the minimum wage should be increased. Congress
has seemed ready to adopt such an increase since 1999, although it had
not acted by early 2001. 
The 1996 welfare reform increased work expectations and de-
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mands for personal responsibility on the part of welfare recipients.
Now it is time to increase demands on government for mutual responsi-
bility.  What is required if we are to reduce poverty as well as welfare
dependency is an increased willingness to spend public funds to devel-
op a work-oriented safety net.
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1. In a time-series regression analysis (not shown), the nonmetro poverty rate is es-
timated to be more responsive to increases in national per capita income than is
the central city poverty rate.  The central city rate is more responsive to changes
in the national unemployment rate.
2. These data are based on computations from the March Current Population Sur-
veys by Deborah Reed, Public Policy Institute of California.  The sample includes
unmarried female heads of household with at least one co-resident child under 18,
who were in the civilian labor force and had at least $1 of earnings.  Students,
those whose primary job is unpaid, and the self-employed are excluded.
3. A third interview was fielded during fall/winter 1999/2000, with a response rate
of 91 percent; a fourth interview in fall 2001 had a 90 percent response rate.
4. Wave 2 has data on 79 percent of the original sample, i.e., the product of the wave
1 and the wave 2 response rates: 0.86 × 0.92.
5. Our use of income sources during a single month may overstate well-being dif-
ferences across the groups if earnings are less stable than welfare income.  We ex-
amined alternative classifications in which mothers were considered wage-reliant
and welfare-reliant only if they were in these categories for three consecutive
months.  The results do not differ much from those presented here.
6. The number of months between a respondent’s wave 1 and wave 2 interviews
ranged from 8 to 16 months (each survey period lasted about four months).  The
mean number of months between interviews was 11.6.
7. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) reported by respondents and included in
Table 1.4 was received by their children or another household member; respon-
dents who received SSI on their own are excluded from the analyses.
8. We estimated the monthly EITC and monthly federal income taxes by using
monthly income sources as proxies for annual income (i.e., we multiply monthly
income from own earnings and unemployment insurance by 12 months).  The
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credit was calculated using only respondent’s earned income and our estimates of
adjusted gross income (which includes unemployment insurance).  Eligibility was
determined by the number of children and amount and source of income.  We as-
sumed that no untaxed earned income, interest and dividends, student loan inter-
est, or scholarship income was received, and no IRA deductions were paid by re-
spondents.  We assumed income reported in the category of “disability, pension or
social security income” reflected Social Security benefits or pension income of
other household members and is therefore nontaxable to the respondent.  We as-
sumed that respondents file returns with themselves and their children as a single
tax unit and excluded other household members’ income if the respondents were
not married.  If they were married, we included husband’s earnings.
9. We also adjusted for state income taxes and for the credit, which Michigan pro-
vides working renters through the state income tax.  Danziger et al. (2001) de-
scribe each income source, tax, tax credit, and expense category.
10. We used administrative data for TANF income rather than self reports, because
the latter tend to be too low for women whose rent or utilities are vendored (i.e.,
paid directly to the landlord or utility company).  For example, in fall 1998, al-
most 15 percent of welfare recipients had their rent vendored.  On the other hand,
for some respondents, the administrative record value of the TANF benefit is too
high.  Because the state pays benefits “prospectively,” a woman who just starts a
job or increases her hours of work, will later have her TANF payment adjusted
downward and the state would recover the overpayment.
11. The percentage of working mothers who reported child care expenses were low
because many received subsidized child care and/or relied upon friends and fam-
ily members or had no young children.  In Michigan, child care subsidies are
available for all welfare recipients and for working families whose incomes fall
below 85 percent of the state’s median income.  Child care costs were higher for
wage-reliant mothers than for combiners, in part, because the former worked, on
average, 6 more hours per week on all jobs.
12. The wage-reliant and combiners worked in almost 75 percent of the months be-
tween February 1997, when the sample was drawn, and the wave 2 survey.  An-
nual poverty rates would be somewhat lower for those not working at wave 2 be-
cause they worked in about 25 percent of the months over this period.
References
Acs, Gregory, Norma Coe, Keith Watson, and Robert Lerman.  1998.  Does
Work Pay? An Analysis of the Work Incentives under TANF.  Washington,
D.C.: The Urban Institute. 
Corcoran, Mary, Sandra K. Danziger, Ariel Kalil, and Kristin Seefeldt.  2000.
“How Welfare Reform Is Affecting Women’s Work.”  Annual Review of So-
ciology 26: 241–269.
Chapter 1 49
Danziger, Sandra K., Mary Corcoran, Sheldon Danziger, and Colleen Heflin.
2000a.  “Work, Income and Material Hardship after Welfare Reform.”
Journal of Consumer Affairs 34: 6–30.
Danziger, Sandra K., Mary Corcoran, Sheldon Danziger, Colleen Heflin, Ariel
Kalil, Judith Levine, Daniel Rosen, Kristin Seefeldt, Kristine Siefert, and
Richard Tolman.  2000b.  “Barriers to the Employment of Welfare Recipi-
ents.”  In Prosperity for All?  The Economic Boom and African Americans,
R. Cherry and W. Rodgers, eds.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp.
239–277.
Danziger, Sheldon, ed.  1999.  Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform.
Kalamazoo, Michigan:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Danziger, Sheldon, and Peter Gottschalk.  1995.  America Unequal.  Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Danziger, Sheldon, Colleen Heflin, Mary Corcoran, and Elizabeth Oltmans.
2001.  “Does It Pay to Move from Welfare to Work?”  University of Michi-
gan working paper, available at <www.ssw.umich.edu/poverty/pubs.html>.
Ellwood, David.  1999.  “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and
Other Social Policy Changes on Work and Marriage in the United States.”
Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Gallagher, L. Jerome, Megan Gallagher, Kevin Perese, Susan Schreiber, and
Keith Watson.  1998.  One Year after Welfare Reform: A Description of
State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of Oc-
tober 1997.  Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
Jantti, Markus, and Sheldon Danziger.  2000.  “Income Poverty in Advanced
Economies.”  In Handbook on Income Distribution, Vol. 1, A.B. Atkinson
and F. Bourguignon, eds.  Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 309–377.
Lampman, Robert J.  1959.  “The Low-Income Population and Economic
Growth.”  U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper no. 12.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.








W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rural dimensions of welfare reform : welfare, food assistance, and poverty in rural
America / Bruce A. Weber, Greg J. Duncan, Leslie A. Whitener, editors.
p. cm.
“This book presents revised versions of about half of the papers presented at a
conference on the title topic held in May 2000”—summary p.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-239-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-88099-240-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Rural poor—United States. 2. Social service, Rural—United States. 3. Public
welfare—United States. 4. United States. Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. I. Weber, Bruce A. II. Duncan, Greg J.





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nairn Chadwick.
Printed in the United States of America.
